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WHAT BEST TO PROTECT TRANSSEXUALS
FROM DISCRIMINATION:
USING CURRENT LEGISLATION OR
ADOPTING A NEW JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK
S. Elizabeth Malloy*
INTRODUCTION

"Unless you have actually experienced transsexualism, you cannot
conceive of the trauma of being cast in the wrong body. It is the
imprisonment of body and of soul."I This quote, taken from the
autobiography of transsexual pioneer Mario Martino, 2 reflects the feelings
of confusion and inadequacy that affect transsexual individuals throughout
the United States and around the world. In addition to this ongoing agony
as a result of being "trapped in the wrong body," transsexuals have suffered
a great deal of discrimination in employment, health care, and education
from a society that is still affixed to traditional notions of sex and gender.3
American society enforces a rigid, binary sex/gender system; there exists
no room for those who do not conform to societal notions of male/female
or man/woman. 4 As a result of this lack of acceptance and understanding,

. Andrew Katsansis Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; J.D. 1991, Duke Law
School; B.A. 1988, College of William and Mary. Many thanks to Jon DeLong, Rebekah Van Drake,
and Jen Dowling for their thorough and enthusiastic research assistance, and to the faculty of the
University of Cincinnati College of Law for their thoughtful comments.
1 Patricia A. Cain, Storiesfrom the Gender Garden: Transsexuals and Anti-DiscriminationLaw, 75
DENV. U. L. REV. 1321, 1343 (1998) (quoting MARIO MARTINO WITH HARRIETT, EMERGENCE: A
TRANSSEXUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1977)).
2 Id. at 1342.
Although there are no exact figures as to the number of transgender individuals in America,
estimates range from between I in 10,000 to 1 in 500. See GORDENE OLGA MACKENZIE,
TRANSGENDER NATION 16 (1994). Studies in smaller European countries show that "roughly 1 per
30,000 adult males and 1 per 100,000 adult females seek sex reassignment surgery," although these
figures do not include transgender individuals who do not seek surgery. MILDRED L. BROWN & CHLOE
ANN ROUNSLEY, TRUE SELVES: UNDERSTANDING TRANSSEXUALISM-FOR FAMILIES, FRIENDS,
COWORKERS, AND HELPING PROFESSIONALS 9 (1996).
4 See Mandi Bierly, Johnny Weir Responds to Commentators Who Questioned His Gender,
Example
He
Sets,
ENTERTAINMENT
WEEKLY
(Feb.
25,
2010,
3:53
PM),

http//popwatch.ew.com/2010/02/25/johnny-weir-olympics-gender-example/. During the 2010 Winter
Olympics, two sports commentators suggested that Johnny Weir, the American figure skater, may have
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transsexuals are victims of discrimination in virtually every aspect of their
lives. Socially, they are outcast because they do not fit into traditional
notions of gender. Legally, they are subject to a variety of obstacles that the
average person would never have to face. In thirty-four states, transsexuals
are unable to change their birth certificate to accommodate their gender
identity and expression, 5 which, in turn, can lead to difficulty obtaining a
driver's license or passport. They are unable to obtain marriage licenses,6
which can affect intestacy 7 and child custody rights.' They even face
discrimination based on their decision to use either a "male" or "female"
restroom.9 To date, existing anti-discrimination laws have been largely
ineffective in remedying the injustices and difficulties that transsexual
individuals face.' 0
This article specifically examines the issues and controversies that
transsexual individuals have encountered as a result of their lack of
protection under anti-discrimination laws, particularly the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII. Part I is an overview of our society's
binary sex/gender system and how this system serves to exclude and
disenfranchise transsexuals. Part II examines the relationship between
disability law and transsexuals, both explaining why they were excluded
from the ADA and how state disability laws have provided more
lost points due to his costume and body language, set a bad example for male figure skaters, and should
undergo a gender test. Id. Weir responded by drawing attention to the offending comments:
Even my gender has been questioned. I want that to be public because I don't want 50
years from now more young boys and girls to have to go through this sort of thing and to
have their whole life basically questioned for no reason other than to make a joke and to
make people watch their television program .... I hope more kids can grow up the same
way that I did and more kids can feel the freedom that I feel to be themselves and to
express themselves .... I think as a person you know what your values are and what you
believe in, and I think that's the most important thing.
Id
s Janine M. deManda, Our Transgressions: The Legal System's Struggle with Providing Equal
Protectionto Transgenderand TranssexualPeople, 71 UMKC L. REV. 507, 522 (2002) (citing Leane
Renee, Impossible Existence: The Clash of Transsexuals, Bipolar Categories, and Law, 5 AM. U.J.
GENDER& L. 343, 393 n.58 (1997)).
6 Id. at 523 (citing In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 1987)).
Id at 524 (citing In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002)).
Id. (citing Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132 (Colo. App. 1973)).
Id. at 523 (citing Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001)).
1o See Cain, supra note 1, at 1354 ("In sum, there is virtually no protection under Title VII for
transsexuals"); Sandra Fluke & Karen Hu, Twelfth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law:
Employment Law and Health Care Access Chapter: Employment Discrimination Against LGBTQ
Persons, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 613 (2011) ("Another category of individuals confronted by sexual
orientation discrimination are those who challenge traditional notions of gender identity, especially
transgender individuals... . Additionally, while gay and lesbian persons have been successful at raising
Title VII claims when the harassment they experienced was due to their nonconformity with gender
norms, they have been less successful in cases in which they were harassed because of their perceived
sexual orientation. .. . Many states exempt employee benefit discrimination from their antidiscrimination statutes, undercutting LGBTQ employees' benefit claims.").
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protection. Part III discusses how transsexuals have fared under a Title VII
sex discrimination approach. This section also analyzes whether Title VII,
or sex discrimination laws in general, are appropriate remedies for
discrimination against transsexuals. Finally, Part IV suggests the need for a
separate category prohibiting discrimination against transsexuals. This
category would be difficult to achieve because it requires the reconstruction
of American society's beliefs, assumptions, and norms associated with the
binary sex/gender system. However, this protection is necessary to provide
transsexuals with the legal recognition that would allow them to gain fair
and equal treatment. Part V concludes that the creation of such a category
could achieve new protections against transsexuality-based discrimination.
I. THE BINARY SEX/GENDER SYSTEM AND
ITS ERASURE OF TRANSGENDER PEOPLE

A. LanguageIssues: Defining and Explaining
Sex, gender, and sexual orientation are distinct concepts. They are not
always indicative of one another and are not necessarily congruent. Sex
refers to one's biological categorization as either female or male.'I Gender,
however, refers to a socially constructed set of mannerisms, preferences,
and attitudes generally associated with a specific sex. 12 In mainstream
society, only female/feminine and male/masculine are recognized and
accepted genders. 13 The binary sex/gender system in American society
assigns females the gender of female/feminine and males the gender of
male/masculine. 14 However, the binary sex/gender system fails to accept
that gender is much more complex than our societal conceptions of women
and men. Rather, gender consists of two distinct concepts: gender identity
and gender expression.15 Gender identity refers to a person's internal sense
of maleness, femaleness, or something in between.1 6 One's "gender
identity is internal and personally defined."' 7 In contrast, gender expression
encompasses "external characteristics and behaviors that are socially
defined as either masculine or feminine."' 8 These may include dress,
mannerisms, and social behaviors; "gender expression is external and
1 Milton Diamond, Sex and Gender Are Diferent: Sexual Identity and Gender Identity Are
7 CLINICAL
CHILD
PSYCHOL.
&
PSYCHIATRY
320,
321
(2002),
http://ccp.sagepub.com/content/7/3/320.
12 Id.
13 See Cain, supra note 1, at
1355.
14 See deManda, supra note 5, at 512.
15 See PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR
ACTIVISTS
AND
POLICYMAKERS
3
(2000),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf
16 Id.
17 Id.
8 Id.

Different,
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socially perceived."' 9 Sexual orientation describes a person's preference of
sexual partners. 20 Heterosexuality, preference for the "opposite" sex, is the
socially accepted norm. 2 1 Society also recognizes, without necessarily
condoning, homosexuality and bisexuality. 22 Similar to society's rigid
definition and conception of gender, sexual orientation is rigidly defined as
well. If one is biologically male and interested in other males sexually, he
is homosexual; if one is biologically female and interested in females, she
is homosexual.
Transsexuals challenge this rigidity by often defining themselves as
heterosexuals who are attracted to those of the same biological sex. 23 This
is because transsexual and transgender individuals feel their biological sex
is not congruent with their internal gender; while a transsexual may be
biologically male, she may ultimately feel that her sex, as her gender,
should be female. 24 Transsexuals often feel that they were just born with
the wrong genitalia. 2 5 Thus, after sex reassignment surgery (SRS), the
majority of male-to-female (MTF) transsexuals pursue male partners, and
the majority of female-to-male (FTM) transsexuals pursue female
26
partners.
Transsexuals, as the most visible people transgressing the gender line,
serve as a good demographic for the law to begin addressing gender
protection issues. Discrimination against another human being based on
immutable characteristics is held as morally wrong; 27 the more immutable
the characteristic is considered, the more urgently the law must intervene. 28
Transsexuality is considered immutable because those who fall into this
category feel they have no choice as to their gender; they simply were born
as the incorrect biological sex. 29 By their mere existence, transgender
19 Id.
20

Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 205, 211 (2009).

21 See id. at 209. Kramer argues that just as white individuals are viewed as "not having a race ...

because privilege functions to obscure whiteness," heterosexuals are similarly "seen as not having a
sexual orientation." Id. at 229. Because of this "paradox of privilege," the courts often presume
heterosexuality in claims of sex discrimination. Id. at 228. Kramer, however, advocates that the courts
reorient their approach in a two-step method: first, acknowledge orientation, whether heterosexual or
otherwise; and then assert the Title VII claim. This will help prevent the courts' too-frequent suspicion
of a plaintiff "bootstrapping" homosexuality to sex discrimination claims. Id. at 235-36.
22 See id. at 217.

23See Kelly M. Ellis & Karen Eriksen, Transsexual and TransgenderistExperiences and Treatment
Options, 10 FAM. J.: COUNSELING & THERAPY FOR COUPLES & FAMILIEs 289, 289 (2002). See also

ROBERT CROOKS & KARLA BAUR, OUR SEXUALITY 130 (1lth ed. 2010); Richard Green, Gender
Development and Reassignment, 3
PSYCHIATRY
26,
28
(2004),
available at
http://www.asia.cmpmedica.com/cmpmedica my/disppdf.cfm?fname=Gende.pdf
24 Ellis & Eriksen, supra note 23, at 289.
25

Id.
26 CROOKS & BAUR, supranote 23, at 130.

27 See William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About AppearanceDiscriminationand the Beauty of Our
Employment DiscriminationLaw, 14 DUKE J GENDER L. & POL'Y 153, 175 (2007).
28

id.

29 See Ellis & Eriksen, supra note 23, at 289.
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individuals call into question the binary sex/gender system, and are
consequently primary targets for discrimination. "The term transgender
arose in the mid-1990s from the grassroots community of gender-different
people. Unlike the term 'transsexual,' it is not a medical or psychiatric
diagnosis." 30 In its broadest, most inclusive sense, the term "transgender"
"encompasses anyone whose identity or behavior falls outside of
stereotypical gender norms." 3 1 Leslie Feinberg explains that "transgender"
is colloquially used as "an umbrella term to include everyone who
challenges the boundaries of sex and gender." 32 The term is necessary to
allow individuals to define themselves, because the language of the binary
sex/gender systems excludes and erases transgender experience. The
multiplicity and variance of transgender experience truly transcend the
current usage and definitions of sex and gender. 33
B. Societal Oppression Fueled by the Binary Sex/Gender System
As a society, our lives are dominated by performing our binary gender
roles and observing the gender performances of others. 34 Judith Butler
referred to our gender performances as a "ritual social drama" where we
"regularly punish those who fail to do their gender right."3 5 Minutes after a
new baby is born, society assigns it a socially accepted gender role; its first
gender performance begins when it dons its pink or blue cap.3 6 Every time
30 Marvin Dunson III, Comment, Sex, Gender, and Transgender: The Present and Future
of
Employment DiscriminationLaw, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 465, 466 n.5 (2001).

"[T]ransgender" has become an umbrella term that is used to describe a wide range of
identities and experiences, including but not limited to: pre-operative, post-operative, and
non-operative transsexual people; male and female cross-dressers (sometimes referred to as
"transvestites," "drag queens" or "drag kings"); intersexed individuals; and men and
women, regardless of sexual orientation, whose appearance or characteristics are perceived
to be gender atypical.
31

Id.

32 LESLIE FEINBERG,

TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC TO

RUPAUL, at x (1996).
3 LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK OR BLUE 5 (1998) [hereinafter TRANS
LIBERATION] ("We are a movement of masculine females and feminine males, cross-dressers,
transsexual men and women, intersexuals bom on the anatomical sweep between female and male,
gender-blenders, many other sex and gender-variant people, and our significant others. All told, we
expand understanding of how many ways there are to be a human being.").
34 See Kristen Schilt & Catherine Connell, Do Workplace Gender Transitions Make Gender
Trouble?, 14 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 596, 600 (2007) ("[I]ndividuals are always doing gender, as
gender is a social process that is constantly negotiated, rather than something innate to men or
women.").
3

See Brian P. McCarthy, Note, Trans Employees and PersonalAppearance Standards Under Title

VII, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 939, 939-40 (2008) (quoting JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM &
THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY, 178-79 (1999)).
36 See Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender
Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83, 88-89 (2008) (quoting JUDITH BUTLER,
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we use a public restroom, we must choose a binary gender role to perform
by selecting the door bearing the appropriate identifying silhouette.
Professor Ruth Colker writes that "[o]ur entire Western system of thought
is based on binary opposition; we define by comparison, by what things are
not." 37 Oppression based on sex, gender, and sexual orientation preserves
the binary sex/gender system that perpetuates the status quo. 38
Gender-differentiation rules are second nature to most people. Many
people have never thought twice about choosing a restroom door or which
box to check for their driver's license. Further, there is little debate over
whether to shave or wear makeup and high heels. Yet, this does not mean
that binary gender-differentiation rules are any less socially constructed. In
fact, historically, many societies have not embraced a solely binary concept
of sex and gender. Cross-gender behavior "ha[s] been present in all
societies from the earliest times, and . .. [these] behaviors and those who
exhibit them have been positively acknowledged by many cultures." 39 The
Siberian Chukchi people have seven gender categories, including types of
men, women, and those in between.4 0 In India, there are two separate
gender categories for transsexuals born as men and transsexuals born as
women. 4 1 Many Native American cultures honored individuals who
identified themselves with the gender opposite their biological sex. 4 2
Referred to as the berdache, 43 the cross-gender behavior of these
individuals did not threaten the gender system because Native American
BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF SEX 7-8 (1993)) ("Consider the medical

interpellation which (the recent emergence of the sonogram notwithstanding) shifts an infant from an
'it' to a 'she' or a 'he,' and in that naming, the girl is 'girled,' brought into the domain of language and
kinship through the interpellation of gender. But that 'girling' does not end there; on the contrary, that
founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and throughout various intervals of time to
reinforce or contest this naturalized effect. The naming is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the
repeated inculcation of a norm.").
37 RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN
LAW 16 (1996).

38 See L. Camille Hebert, Transforming Transsexual and Transgender Rights, 15 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 535 (2009). Professor H6bert offers some insight into society's oppressive attitudes and
treatment of transsexuals:
Men, even those who do not hold negative views of women, may find it incomprehensible
that transsexual women are willing and even eager to give up their penises. And some men
may also feel that transsexual men are merely "passing" as men and therefore seeking a
status and privileges to which they are not entitled; sometimes these feelings are expressed
in the form of sex-based violence and rape. Similarly, some women may view transsexual
women as interlopers and not true women and transsexual men as traitors.
Id. at 565-66.
39 Ellis & Eriksen, supra note 23, at 291.
40 See deManda, supra note 5, at 519.
41 Id. at 520.
42

Id. at 519.

43 Evelyn Blackwood, Sexuality and Gender in CertainNative American Tribes: The Case of CrossGenderFemales, 10 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC'Y 27, 27 n.1 (1984).
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tribes lived without strict gender definitions. 44 However, as the ideology of
the Native American tribes changed and conformed to the dominant
ideology of Western culture, the cross-gendered acceptance of these tribes
suffered its final demise. 45
Western society's binary sex/gender system is based on an assumption
that there is a correct, "natural," and easily ascertainable definition of what
it means to be a "real" man and a "real" woman. 46 These definitions are
explained through the gender stereotypes that make up society's gender
norms. While each of us knows that we do not fit these definitions
perfectly, they are drilled into our minds through education and popular
culture until they are accepted-"[t]hese gender messages play on and on
in a continuous loop in our brains, like commercials that can't be muted." 4 7
C. ChallengesFacing TransgenderIndividuals
Transsexual individuals are discriminated against because they do not,
and cannot, fit into these narrow social norms. They cannot accurately
check the "M" or "F" box on their driver's license application because
neither option adequately describes them.4 8 They do not conform to
society's binary sex/gender system. Transsexual individuals routinely
suffer "police harassment, ... sexism, high unemployment, low wages, job
insecurity, homelessness, [and] lack of health care." 49 This discrimination
is compounded by the lack of protection transsexuals have received under
existing anti-discrimination laws.5 0
In addition to discrimination in health care and employment,
transsexual individuals encounter hostility and systemic discrimination in
other areas. Transsexuals interested in becoming foster parents are often
declared unsuitable placements for youths because due to their gender
identity. 5 1 Because of false stereotypes about transsexual parents, 52 foster
See id. at 28-29.
4 Id. at 28.
4

46

TRANs LIBERATION, supra note 33, at 3.

47 Id at 4; Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include TransgenderRights in

the Strugglesfor Sex and Sexual OrientationEquality, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 392, 415 (2001).
48 See TRANS LIBERATION, supra note 33, at 20. Feinberg points
out that even the "M" and "F"
boxes are ambiguous; do they mean "male" and "female," or "masculine" and "feminine"? This point
emphasizes the mandatory assumption by the binary sex/gender system-that the two are one and the
same. Transgender individuals, however, are proof that they are not. See id.
49 Id. at 135-36. See also Norman P. Spack et al., Children and Adolescents with Gender Identity
Disorder Referred to a Pediatric Medical Center, 129 PEDIATRICS 418, 422 (2012), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/129/3/418.full.html (noting that the lack of medical centers
for treating children and adolescents with gender identify disorder leads to later harms and delayed
diagnoses).
'o See discussion infra Parts 11,Ill.
5' See Jessica Breslin ed., Family Law: Adoption and Foster Care, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 673,
701-02 (2009).
5 See Overview of Lesbian and Gay Parenting,Adoption and Foster Care, ACLU (Apr. 6, 1999),
http://www.aclu.org/1gbt-rights-hiv-aids/overview-lesbian-and-gay-parenting-adoption-and-foster-care.
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children may be removed from homes after child welfare personnel
discover that a foster parent is a non-heterosexual individual. 53 Transsexual
parents stand to lose either custody or all parental rights entirely. 54
As a result of the lack of understanding and legal protection against
discrimination, transsexual individuals have confronted tremendous
obstacles while trying to obtain proper medical care. Many private
insurance companies exclude sex reassignment surgery and hormone
treatments from their coverage, often maintaining that these procedures are
cosmetic or experimental. 55 In some cases, insurers have denied entire
medical plans as soon as they are informed of a person's transsexuality. 56
Transsexual prisoners face additional challenges when seeking medical
care.57 They are often subject to violence and rape because of their gender
identity.58
Along with this callous indifference on the part of some doctors and
insurers concerning their major needs, the transsexual individual faces
numerous other difficulties involving everyday inconveniences, such as
using public restrooms. 59 Indeed, if a company wants to fire a transsexual
employee, the restroom issue is the least controversial way of doing so. 60
For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has supported objections to a
transsexual employee's change in restroom use. 6 1 Recently, courts have
even invalidated the marriages of transsexual litigants to avoid designating
them as surviving spouses. 62

" See GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 15 (2007), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-Badgett-

Macomber-Chambers-Final-Adoption-Report-Mar-2007.pdf.
54 See Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 56-60 (Nev. 1986) (finding that termination of a transsexual's
parental rights were in the "child's best interests").
" TRANSGENDER
FIGHTING

LAW CENTER,
HEALTH

TRANSGENDER HEALTH AND THE LAW: IDENTIFYING AND
CARE
DISCRIMINATION
(2004),

http://transgenderlawcenter.org/pdflHealth%20Law/ 20fact%20sheet.pdf
56 Id. See also Spack, supra note 49, at 419, 422 (describing the harmful effects of failure to timely
diagnose gender identity disorder, including depression, suicide, and drug abuse).
57 See e.g. Bradley Sultan, Note, TranssexualPrisoners:How Much Treatment Is Enough?, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 1195, 1217-20 (2003).
5 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
5 See COLKER, supra note 37, at 112.
6 See Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001) (finding that an employer's designation
of restrooms by biological gender did not constitute sexual discrimination against a male transsexual
employee wishing to use the female restroom).
61 Id.
62

See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
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II. DISABILITY LAW AS AN AVENUE OF PROTECTION FOR
TRANSSEXUAL INDIVIDUALS

A. Are TranssexualIndividualsDisabled?
When analyzing the protection of transsexual plaintiffs under disability
law, the first question that invariably arises is whether transsexual
individuals should be considered disabled. Societal notions about disabled
individuals include people with physical infirmities, such as paraplegics
and muscular dystrophy patients, and those with severe emotional and
psychological disorders. Although transsexuals are not "disabled" in the
traditional sense-they are not infirm, nor are they impaired from
performing physical tasks-they are considered disabled within the
medical community. 63 This classification has generated a great deal of
controversy.
Gender identity disorder (GID) is an important method of bringing
transsexual individuals under the scope of state disability laws. The
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) classifies
transsexualism as a gender identity disorder. 64 To be diagnosed with GID,
individuals must demonstrate several criteria, 65 the most important of
which are persistent cross-gender identification and evidence of discomfort
about one's assigned sex. 66 GID "is applied to children who feel dissonant
with their assigned anatomic gender and display gender dysphoria," 67 and
its onset typically occurs during a child's preschool years. 68 Common
examples of such behavior include "[a] boy who insists on wearing makeup
and women's clothing," or a girl who "refuse[s] to wear dresses[] [and]
idolize[s] male superheroes." 69
GID is not without its limitations. While many transsexuals recall
similar childhood experiences as these, many children who suffer from
See Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, PursuingProtectionfor TransgenderPeople Through
DisabilityLaws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 74-89 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).
6 See Samantha J. Levy, Comment, Trans-Forming Notions of Equal Protection: The Gender
Identity Class, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 141, 145 (2002) (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 576-82 (4th ed., 2000)) (listing the
diagnostic criteria for GID).
65 Ellis & Eriksen, supra note 23, at 290 ("[T]o be diagnosed with GID, individuals must
demonstrate four or more of the following criteria: '(1) a repeatedly stated desire to be, or insistence
that he or she is, the other sex, (2) in boys, preference for cross-dressing or simulating female attire; in
girls, insistence on wearing only stereotypical masculine clothing, (3) strong and persistent preferences
for cross-sex roles in make believe play or persistent fantasies of being the other sex, (4) intense desire
to participate in the stereotypical games and pastimes of the other sex, (5) strong preference for
playmates of the other sex."').
66 Herbert Bower, The Gender Identity Disorder in the DSM-IV Classification: A Critical
Evaluation,35 AUSTL. &N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 2 (2001).
67 Ellen C. Perrin, Helping Parents and Children Understand "Gender Identity Disorder", 19
BROWN U. CHILD & ADOLESCENT BEHAV. LETTER 1, 3 (2003).
63

68

Id. at 4.
at 3.

69 Id
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GID as children "do not mature into adults with gender identity disorder." 70
Further, due to the strict criteria required for a GID diagnosis, many adult
transsexuals cannot be diagnosed with GID "when they are no longer
experiencing distress over their gender identity-either because they are
living as the gender they feel themselves to be or because they have had
sex reassignment surgery." 7 1 The diagnostic criteria are "rife with gender
stereotypes" in its classifications for "normal" male and female behavior. 72
For example, boys may have an affinity for "play[ing] with Barbie dolls,"
while girls may be opposed to "wear[ing] dresses or other feminine
attire." 73 These classifications clearly endorse a binary system of sex and
gender.
The benefit of a GID diagnosis, however, is that GID constitutes a
disability in several states, which qualifies transsexual individuals for
medical coverage and brings them under the protection of state disability
discrimination provisions. 74 Further, a GID diagnosis is often required
before transsexuals can undergo the "ultimate step" of sex reassignment
surgery. 75 The procedure is lengthy and costly, involving "two years of
preparation
before
the
operation[,] . . . .
three
months
of
psychotherapy[,] . ... [and] liv[ing] 24 hours a day in the target gender for

a period of one to two years while continuing hormone therapy." 76 These
expenses may cost as high as $50,000.77 Thus, being diagnosed with GID is
necessary for many transsexual individuals seeking medical care, sex
reassignment surgery, or protection under state disability laws. 78
An illustration of the courts' recognition of GID as a disability is the
pre-ADA federal case of Doe v. United States PostalService.79 In this case,
a transsexual individual's employer allegedly had violated the
Rehabilitation Act by firing her after learning of her plans to undergo sex
reassignment surgery. 80 The plaintiff argued that she was protected under
the Act because of her "medically and psychologically established need for
[SRS]. 8' First, the court reasoned that her transsexualism rose to the level
of a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting a major life

70 Green, supra note 23, at 26-27.

" Ellis & Eriksen, supra note 23, at 290.
72 H6bert, supranote 38,
at 553 n.104.
73

id.

See discussion infra Part II.C.
Levy, supra note 64, at 146 (quoting Terry S. Kogan, Transsexualsand CriticalGender Theory:
The Possibility ofa Restroom Labeled "Other",48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1227 (1997)).
76 Id.
74
7

7 See Kari E. Hong, Categorical Exclusions: Exploring Legal Responses to Health Care
DiscriminationAgainst Transsexuals, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 88, 103 (2002).
7 No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985).
o Id. at *1.

* Id. at *2.
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activity. 82 Further, the court found that her transsexualism constituted an
impairment that "substantially limitated at least her major life activity of
'working."' 8 3 Since one can be disabled because others merely regard her
as having an impairment, the plaintiff was allowed to bring her claim under
the Rehabilitation Act. 84
B. Exclusionfrom the ADA
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to address the pervasive
discrimination against disabled individuals in areas such as health care,
education, employment, and public services. 8 5 Finding that 43 million
Americans had one or more physical or mental disabilities, Congress
designed the Act so that, as one advocate explained, "persons [would be]
judged by their abilities and not on the basis of their disabilities."8 6
However, in proceeding to eliminate legal boundaries against the
disabled, the Act simultaneously erected new boundaries on a wide group
of individuals, including transsexuals. The ADA excludes from coverage
"homosexuality and bisexuality," 8 7 as well as "transvestism,
transsexualism, pedophelia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity
disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior
disorders." 88 The deliberate exclusion of transsexual individuals is
particularly questionable, considering that the ADA drafters referenced the
DSM, 89 which classifies GID as a disorder. 90 Furthermore, the Act was
intended to cover a broad range of impairments, from "anxiety caused by
heavy traffic to borderline personalit[y] [disorder]." 9 1
When looking at the legislative history of the ADA, however, it is not
difficult to discern why transsexuals were deliberately excluded from its
protection. In the course of congressional debate on the legislation, Senator
Jesse Helms engaged in a heated debate with Senator Tom Harkin as to
whether HIV-positive individuals and transvestites should be covered by
the Act.92 Helms had previously criticized case law under the
Rehabilitation Act, which protected "transvetism and other compulsions or

82 Id. at *3.
8 Id.

Id.
s 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2010).
86 Adrienne L. Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral
Code, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1451, 1468 (1994) (quoting testimony at congressional hearings on the Act)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 48 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 330).
" 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (2010).
88 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2011).
89 See Levy, supra note 64, at 150-5 1.
84

98 Id. at 145.

9 Hiegel, supra note 86, at 1471 (citations omitted).
92 See 135 CONG. REc. S10765-01 (1989). Interestingly, Helms apparently confused transvestites
with transsexuals, although it is doubtful whether he would have voted differently had he
comprehended this distinction.
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addictions, which churches or religious schools might once have felt
comfortable in regarding as moral problems." 93 At another point, Helms
asked, "Do we really want to prohibit ... private institutions from making
employment decisions based on moral qualifications?" 94
Helms, therefore, sought to exclude the transsexual community from
the ADA because of his moral disapproval, as well as the fear that
Rehabilitation Act cases like Doe v. United States PostalService would be
applied to private companies. 95 This "unprincipled exclusion" is especially
ironic, considering that the ADA was enacted precisely to eliminate bigotry
against groups subjected to disability-based discrimination. 96 As will be
discussed later on, some transsexual advocates have argued that this section
of the ADA should be deemed unconstitutional for this very reason. 97
Since its enactment, the ADA has faced much criticism for its failure to
provide protection to many disabled Americans. 98 Much of this has been
due to several Supreme Court cases that have narrowly defined the term
"disability" under the law. 99 Accordingly, Congress has revisited the ADA
in an effort to revitalize its scope. 0 0 The amendments attempt to restore the
ADA's original definition of disability.' 0' However, although the ADA
Amendments Act was passed in 2008 with a new emphasis on covering
more individuals, the provision denying coverage to transsexuals was not
addressed. 102
C. State DisabilityLaws
As a result of their purposeful exclusion from the ADA, transsexual
plaintiffs have relied on state disability laws, which provide a broader
definition of disability. In Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, 103 the Massachusetts
Superior Court ruled that a 15-year-old biological male diagnosed with
GID could not be prohibited from wearing feminine clothing at school.104
The defendants argued that Doe, by wearing women's clothing, had
9" RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 25 (2005).

94 COLKER, supra note 37, at 163.
9s See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
96 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2010). See Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions:
The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equalityfor TransgenderPeople, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 37 (2000).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 148-54.
9 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Introduction, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING
DISABILITY RIGHTS 1, 5-14 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003).
99 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 § 2(a)(4)-(7) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12210 (2010)).
'" ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(a)(3), (b)(1)-(5).
'1 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(a)(1).
'02 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008.
'0' No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), affd sub nom. Doe v.
Brockton Sch. Comm'n, No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
'" Id. at *5.
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violated the dress code that prohibited "clothing which could be disruptive
or distractive to the educational process or which could affect the safety of
students." 0 5 The complaint alleged that the school had violated Article
CXIV of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. 106 In
its opinion, the court shrugged off the exclusion of transsexuals from the
ADA, 10 7 noting that Article CXIV did not specifically define which
handicaps were protected.108 The court interpreted this to mean that
persons "who were previously thought to be eccentric or iconoclastic (or
worse)" by society may have physical and mental impairments that warrant
protection from discrimination.109 As a result, the court accepted the
plaintiffs claim that she was a "qualified handicapped individual" entitled
to protection under Article CXIV.' 10
Likewise, in Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems,' 1' the New Jersey
Superior Court found that West Jersey Health Systems had violated the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). 112 The plaintiff, born a
biological male, had practiced as a private physician in New Jersey for
approximately twenty years before being hired by the defendant.1 13 Over
the next two years, Enriquez began the transition process from male to
female, including shaving her beard, sculpting and waxing her eyebrows,
'05 Id. at *1.

'6 Id. at *7. Article CXIV of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts provides: "No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity
within
the
commonwealth."
MASS.
CONST.
art.
CXIV,
available
at
http://www.malegislature.gov/laws/constitution.
107 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 664947, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26,
2001) (stating that "this Commonwealth has a proud and independent tradition in protecting the civil
rights of its citizens, and will not follow in lock-step federal civil rights law.... Simply because the
United States Congress chose, after enacting the Federal Rehabilitation Act, to exclude from the
definition of an 'individual with a disability' those persons with 'gender identity disorders not resulting
from physical impairments' does not mean that this Court must define a 'handicapped individual' under
Article CXIV to exclude persons with these disorders.").
10

id.

109Id.
'1o Id. See also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (finding that
Massachusetts may not "deny the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to
two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry."). The Goodridge court echoed the Doe ex rel. v.
Yunits decision, noting that "[t]he Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty
against government incursion as zealously, and often more so, than does the Federal Constitution, even
where both Constitutions employ essentially the same language." 798 N.E.2d at 959. Thus, in finding
that "central to personal freedom and security is the assurance that the laws will apply equally to
persons in similar situations," the court opened the door not only for same-sex marriages, but also for
transgender marriages as well. Id at 959.
". 777 A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). See also M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 208-09 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (upholding the validity of a marriage between a husband and his wife, a
post-operative MTF transsexual, and explaining that "there are several criteria . . . which may be
relevant in determining the sex of an individual. . . . [W]e disagree . . . that for adjudging the capacity to
enter marriage, sex in its biological sense should be the exclusive standard.").
112 Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 380.
"1 Id. at 367.
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and growing breasts.114 The plaintiff was diagnosed with GID and, one
month later, received a letter terminating her employment contract.III She
filed suit under the LAD, alleging discrimination based on disability,
sexual orientation, and gender. 116 The court found that her GID diagnosis
fell under the "mental, psychological or developmental disability"
provision of the LAD's definition of "handicap."" 7 The court noted that,
unlike the ADA, the statute did not require the employee to be
"substantially limit[ed] in any "major life activity.""l8 The mere fact that
the plaintiff had been terminated because of a disability listed in the DSMIV was enough to bring her under the LAD's protection.119
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits and Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Systems
are two of the more notable cases in which state courts, explicitly
discounting the ADA's exclusionary definition of disability, acted to
protect transsexual plaintiffs from employment discrimination.' 2 0 Most
states have not followed the analysis in these cases, and have instead
interpreted their state disability laws quite narrowly to exclude protection
for transsexuals.
D. Limitations ofState Disability Laws
Yunits and Enriquez, although undoubtedly encouraging, are also
unique. Both Massachusetts and New Jersey have broad definitions of
"handicap," and as these two cases demonstrate, their state courts are
willing to apply anti-discrimination statutes broadly to protect transsexual

114 Id. at 368.

s Id. Approximately nine months after her termination, Enriquez underwent sex reassignment
surgery to become a female. Id. at 369.
116 Id. at 369.
"' Id. at 374.
" Enriquez, 777 A.2d at 375.

"' Id. at 376-77. The court rejected Enriquez's sexual orientation discrimination claim, since she had
"failed to establish a prima facie case ... because she was not a homosexual or bisexual[,] or perceived
to be homosexual or bisexual." Id. at 371. However, the court did find that she had been a victim of
gender discrimination, citing cases from other states interpreting "sex discrimination" broadly along
with New Jersey's liberal construction of the LAD, and concluded that "sex discrimination" included
gender-based discrimination as well. Id. at 372-73.
120 See also Lie v. Sky Publ'g Corp., No. 013117J, 2002 WL 31492397 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7,
2002) (finding that a transsexual plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination based on
sex and disability under a state law prohibiting employment discrimination); Jette v. Honey Farms Mini
Market, 2001 WL 1602799 (Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination Oct. 10, 2001) (finding that a claim
for disability discrimination existed where an MTF employee had been forced to use her male name and
dress in male clothing); Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (finding that the state law
against disability discrimination in foster care facilities warranted a "reasonable accommodation" for a
minor with GID who wished to wear female clothing); Evans v. Hamburger Hamlet & Fomcrook, No.
93-E-177, 1996 WL 941676 (Chi. Comm'n Human Relations May 8, 1996) (finding that an employer
had violated a city ordinance prohibiting disability discrimination when it fired an MTF transsexual for
refusing to cut her hair); Smith v. Jacksonville Corr. Inst., No. 88-5451, 1991 WL 833882 (Fla. Div.
Admin. Hearings Oct. 2, 1991) (finding that an MTF transsexual was protected by the disability
discrimination provisions of the Florida Human Rights Act).
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individuals. In most other states, courts have been consistently hostile
towards transsexual plaintiffs. Two state court cases, Littleton v. Prangel21
and Doe v. Boeing Co.,1 22 illustrate the thinly disguised animosity that
transsexual litigants confront in less-hospitable states.
In Littleton, the plaintiff, an MTF transsexual, married a heterosexual
male ten years after undergoing sex reassignment surgery.12 3 Upon her
husband's death, Littleton filed a medical malpractice suit against his
doctor.124 In response, the defendant filed a motion asserting that Littleton
was a man, and thus could not be the surviving spouse of another man
under Texas law.125 The majority adamantly refused to determine whether
the plaintiff was a female after her sex reassignment surgery, arguing that
"[s]uch matters ... are beyond this court's consideration." 26 Since
Littleton was a male on her birth certificate, the majority found that the
marriage to her deceased husband was invalid under Texas law, which
prohibited her from bringing a cause of action as his surviving spouse.127
In Doe v. Boeing, the plaintiff employee had been hired while she "was
a biological male and presented herself as such on her application."' 28 Six
years later, Doe began undergoing hormone treatments. 129 Though Doe
informed Boeing of her need to dress as a female to qualify for sex
reassignment surgery, Boeing prohibited her use of women's restrooms and
dressing in feminine attire until after she had completed the surgery.130 Doe
disregarded Boeing's policy, and after Boeing had received several
complaints, she was terminated. 131
Doe subsequently brought a handicap discrimination claim against
Boeing under Washington's Law Against Discrimination. 32 The
Washington Supreme Court, in determining whether Doe was handicapped,
acknowledged that "[g]ender dysphoria is a medically cognizable and
diagnosable condition." 133 Nevertheless, since Boeing had not terminated
Doe because of her condition, the court found that Doe was not considered

9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993).
123 9 S.W.3d at
225.
124 id.
125 id.
126 Id. at 231.
127 Id. See also In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002) (finding that an MTF
transsexual's
marriage to a male was invalid, even though she had had her birth certificate amended to state that she
was female).
128 Doe v. Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash.
1993).
129 id
121
122

130 Id.
'1'
132
133

Id. at 534.
id.
Id. at 535.
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handicapped and, thus, was not protected under the statute. 134 In addition,
the court found that Boeing had accommodated Doe's gender dysphoria by
allowing her to wear unisex clothing to work, and that this accommodation
was reasonable because Doe "had no medical need to dress as a woman at
work in order to qualify for ... [SRS]."l35
Littleton v. Prange and Doe v. Boeing highlight the unwillingness of
many state courts to provide even the most basic legal protections for
transsexual individuals. Even courts in states with transsexual-inclusive
anti-discrimination laws have been reluctant to interpret these laws broadly.
In Goins v. West Group,136 for example, female coworkers of an MTF
transsexual had objected to her use of the female restroom. 137 Their
employer considered this a "hostile work environment concern," and thus
"decided to enforce the policy of restroom use according to biological
gender."l 38 Goins refused to abide by this policy and continued using the
female restroom, eventually resigned, and brought suit.139 Although
Minnesota's pioneering anti-discrimination statute appeared to cover
transsexual plaintiffs,1 40 the state supreme court interpreted the statute very
narrowly, concluding that it did not require employers to designate
restrooms on the basis of gender self-image. 14 1 The Goins court's highly
restrictive interpretation of a seemingly broad anti-discrimination statute
reflects the approach that other state courts have taken,142 and demonstrates
why Yunits and Enriquez remain exceptions.
E. Weaknesses of the ADA
First and foremost, the ongoing discrimination that transsexual
individuals face as a result of being excluded from the ADA demonstrates
the Act's inherent weakness. Heralded as the most important civil rights

134 846 P.2d at 536 ("Boeing discharged Doe because she violated Boeing's
directives on acceptable
attire, not because she was gender dysphoric. Doe was treated in a respectful way by both her peers and
supervisors at Boeing.").
1
Id. at 537.
136 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
1n Id. at 721.

id.
Id. ("The definition of 'sexual orientation' [in the Minnesota Human Rights Act] includes 'having
or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's biological
maleness or femaleness."').
141 Id. at 723.
142 See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that Minnesota
statutory law "neither requires nor prohibits restroom designation according to .. . biological sex"). See
also Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding that the determination of whether
an MTF transsexual is "male" or "female" was "beyond this court's consideration"); Doe v. Boeing
Co., 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993) (finding no discrimination because plaintiffs termination was due
to violation of a dress code, not her gender dysphoria).
139

140
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law since the 1960s,14 3 the ADA has instead served to legitimize
discrimination against transsexual individuals, not only by deliberately
excluding them from protection, but also by placing them in the same
category as pedophiles, exhibitionists, and voyeurs.144 Not surprisingly,
state courts have opportunistically used this categorization to deny
transsexual plaintiffs protection under state disability and discrimination
laws.14 5
The ADA's exclusion of transsexual individuals was apparently driven
by moral disapproval. As mentioned previously, Senator Helms argued
during Senate deliberations that private employers should be allowed to
discriminate against groups they consider morally objectionable.1 46 Of
course, it is this precise type of ignorance on the part of employers and
health care providers that the ADA was supposed to redress.147
As a result, some critics argue that the clause in the ADA excluding
transsexuals should be declared unconstitutional for violating the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.14 8 Even under a rational
basis test, these critics maintain that the ADA's exclusion of transsexual
individuals is unconstitutional, since "it disadvantages a particular group of
individuals and is neither a rational means nor a legitimate end of
government action."1 49
Here, an analogy between transsexual individuals and the gay and
lesbian community is apt. In Romer v. Evans,150 the Supreme Court struck
down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited all
executive, legislative, and judicial action to protect homosexuals from
discrimination.' 5 1 Justice Kennedy argued that "the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests." 1 52 Expanding upon this
logic, and with the support of legislative history, a transsexual litigant
could persuasively argue that the ADA provision was inserted solely as a
result of animus against transsexual individuals, thus failing the rational
basis test. 153 However, the likelihood of such a claim succeeding is
doubtful, given the general hostility of federal courts towards transsexual
plaintiffs. The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari of two cases
143

Nancy Lee Jones, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Statutory Language
and Recent Issues,

ALMANAC

OF

POLICY

ISSUES

(Aug.

http://www.policyalmanac.org/social welfare/archive/crsada.shtml.
'" 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2010).
145 See supranotes 121-142 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying
text.
147 See Hiegel,supra note 86, at 1468.
148 See Hong, supra note 78,
at 124-25.
149 Id. at
125.
150

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

' Id. at 633-36.
152
15

Id. at 632.
See Hiegel, supra note 86, at 1452-53; Hong, supranote 78, at 125.

1,

2001),
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involving transsexual plaintiffs,1 54 which may indicate either discomfort or
disinterest in resolving legal issues affecting the transsexual community at
large.
F. Controversy Within the Transsexual Community Concerning
Use ofDisabilityLaws
Perhaps the most controversial issue within the transsexual community
with respect to disability anti-discrimination laws concerns whether they
should be considered disabled at all. While the DSM-IV classification is
necessary for transsexual patients who wish to undergo surgery or hormone
treatments, or be reimbursed for transition-related medical care, transsexual
advocates argue that the classification would perpetuate the stereotype that
"transgendered people are inherently disturbed or unstable." 55 As
transgender attorney and activist Dean Spade stated, "There is a gut
reaction that occurs, where people feel that using disability law claims
means we are arguing that we are somehow flawed people." 56
This concern echoes the battles that gay activists fought over thirty
years ago to remove the psychiatric stigma associated with homosexuality.
In the early 1970s, gay activists and prominent psychiatrists began to
challenge long-held assumptions about homosexuality as a mental
disorder.157 The American Psychiatric Association, after conceding that
"there was no valid data to link homosexuality and mental illness,"
removed homosexuality from the DSM list of mental disorders in 1973.58
Although gays and lesbians still suffer discrimination, they no longer have
to rely on medical diagnoses or disability discrimination laws to receive
judicial protection.159
The unwillingness to be considered disabled is especially relevant,
considering that transsexual activists are working towards inclusion in antidiscrimination protections based on sexual orientation. 160 Thus, if gay men
and lesbians do not consider themselves disabled, some may question why

154 Littleton v. Prange, 531 U.S. 872 (2000); In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002), cert.
denied sub nom. Gardiner v. Gardiner, 537 U.S. 825 (2002).
'5 Shannon Minter & Phyllis Randolph Frye, GID and the Transgender Movement: A Joint
Statement by the InternationalConference on TransgenderLaw and Employment Policy (ICTLEP) and
the
National
Center
for
Lesbian
Rights
(NCLR)
(Nov.
14,
1996),
http://www.transgenderlegal.com/gid1.htm.
156 Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 34
(2003).
157 See K.H., PanelistsRecount Events Leading to Deleting Homosexuality as a PsychiatricDisorder
from DSM, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (July 17, 1998), http://psychnews.org/pnews/98-07-17/dsm.html.

158 Id.

'5 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-36 (1996). See also Matthew Clark, Comment, Stating a
Title VII Claimfor Sexual OrientationDiscriminationin the Workplace: The Legal Theories Available
After Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REv. 313 (2003) (discussing various legal theories used
in sexual orientation discrimination claims).
160 See Minter & Frye, supra
note 155.
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transsexuals are obliged to classify themselves as such. 16 1 These questions
go to the very heart of what disability law represents, and what groups
should be classified as disabled.
Some activists contend that this categorization is demeaning and
stereotypical because it implies that transsexual individuals are not
normal. 162 In this regard, the transsexual community is not alone;
individuals in existing disabled groups, such as paraplegics and the deaf,
are also resistant to being characterized as such.163 This lingering
resentment calls into question what function the "disabled" label serves in
this age of heightened sensitivity and political empowerment.
Although many transsexual activists object to being labeled "disabled,"
others argue that it is essential for transsexual individuals to retain this
classification, even though it is a manifestation of societal discrimination
rather than an actual medical disability. 164 First, many transsexual patients
would not have access to sex reassignment surgery or hormone treatments
if they were not diagnosed with GID.1 65 Furthermore, in many states,
retaining this classification is essential to guarantee that transsexuals who
leave work to undergo SRS will not encounter discrimination in pay,
advancement, or medical benefits when they return. 166 Thus, whatever
moral and philosophical reasons may exist for refusing the "disabled"
classification, proponents maintain that pragmatic considerations are more
important. Obviously, this debate is by no means over.
G. Should TranssexualIndividualsBe Included in the ADA?
Ultimately, the question confronting the transsexual community is
whether it is necessary, or even helpful, to receive ADA protection. Some
critics argue that the stigma associated with being transsexual would not
dissipate even under the ADA's coverage, and thus, the disability rights
framework should eventually be jettisoned altogether. 16 7 Furthermore, both
the Supreme Court and lower courts have developed an increasingly
See Levy, supranote 64, at 165-66.
See Hiegel, supra note 86, at 1451 ("When we call someone disabled, we make a statement ...
indicating something about our belief in his or her ability to fulfill a measure of human potential.");
Spade, supranote 151, at 34.
163 See, e.g., Kim E. Nielsen, DeafHistory and the U.S. HistoricalNarrative,31 REVIEWS AM. HIST.
161
162

596, 599-600 (2003) (reviewing SUSAN BURCH, SIGNS OF RESISTANCE: AMERICAN DEAF CULTURAL

HISTORY, 1900 to 1942 (2002)) (explaining that the designation of deaf individuals as disabled persons
"left a highly stigmatized status that undermined social legitimacy," which they resisted by "claiming
they were not disabled but simply communicated differently.").
'64 See Hong, supra note 78, at 107. When homosexuals were classified as disabled, they were all
classified as such, and thus, the discrimination stemmed from their actual disability. In contrast, only
some transsexuals are diagnosed with GID. Levy, supra note 64, at 165. Since a finding of disabilitybased discrimination depends on a medical diagnosis, individuals who suffer societal prejudices but do
not seek medical treatment are effectively excluded. See id. at 165.
165 Hong, supra note 78,
at 96 n.32.
'66Id. at 107.
67

See Minter & Frye, supra note 155.
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narrow interpretation of the scope of the ADA. 16 8 Thus, legitimate
questions persist as to whether ADA protection would even be helpful to
transsexual litigants.
However, those who support including transsexual individuals under
the ADA could plausibly argue that this classification would be helpful,
irrespective of success in the courts. Along with more benefits, such as
allowing preoperative transsexuals to receive proper medical care, the
ADA can serve as a vital catalyst to change long-held societal prejudices
against the transsexual community. While this is still widely debated, it is a
theory that offers hope for transsexuals under the ADA.
III. TRANSSEXUALS AND TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. History
Transsexual litigants who experience discrimination in employment
may also look to Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination as an
avenue for protection. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer "to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 69
In Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,170 the Ninth Circuit first dealt
with Title VII's application to transsexual plaintiffs.171 The plaintiff,
Ramona Holloway, was an MTF transsexual who had transitioned while
employed at Arthur Andersen.1 72 A company official responded to her
transition by "suggesting that [she] would be happier at a new job where
her transsexualism would be unknown."1 73 Holloway was fired shortly
after she had changed her personnel records to reflect her new first
name. 174 She sued under Title VII, alleging that Arthur Andersen had
discriminated against her because of her transsexuality.1 75 The Ninth
Circuit rejected Holloway's argument that the term "sex" as used in Title
VII was synonymous with "gender," and that "gender" should be
understood to include transsexuals.1 76 Instead, it found that Title VII was
168 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490-94 (1999) (finding that visionimpaired individuals must be substantially limited in their ability to work in order to qualify for ADA
protection); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1999) (finding that an
individual's disqualification for one job does not constitute a substantial limitation in "the major life
activity of working"); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 555, 562-65 (1999) (finding that only
impairments that substantially limit a major life activity are protectable under the ADA).
169 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2010).
"o 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
171 See Dunson, supra note 30,
at 470.
172 566 F.2d at
661.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id
.
116 Idat662.
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meant "to place women on an equal footing with men," and "had only the
traditional notions of 'sex' in mind."17 7
Ultimately, the Holloway court did not have to analyze Holloway's
Title VII claim under the context of either sex discrimination or gender
discrimination, because it framed the issue as one of whether an employer
may fire an individual for initiating the process of changing her sex. 178 The
court held that "an individual's decision to undergo sex reassignment
surgery does not bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class, within
the scope of Title VII."17 9
Under the Holloway court's reasoning, "for the purposes of equality
law, a transitional transsexual such as Ramona Holloway can be defined as
neither a man nor a woman," but rather "as a transsexual for whom there is
no Title VII protection."18 0 This reasoning casted Holloway and other
transitioning transsexuals as "neither male nor female but as a third sexthe sex that changes sex." 1 8 1 Because transsexual litigants are not easily
slotted into "sex" categories, they would not be entitled to Title VII
protection under this approach.1 82
After Holloway, other circuit courts followed the Ninth Circuit's lead in
denying Title VII protection to transsexual individuals. The pre-operative
MTF plaintiff in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc.183 was fired just two
days after she was hired because she had allegedly misrepresented herself
as a female on her job application.1 84 Budget argued that this
misrepresentation was disruptive because female employees had threatened
to quit if the plaintiff had been allowed to use the women's restroom. 185
Refusing to address the plaintiff s "psychological makeup," the court found
that, for Title VII purposes, plaintiff was male because she was
anatomically male. 186 Then, relying on Holloway, the court found that plain
meaning should be given to the term "sex," absent clear congressional
intent to do otherwise.18 7 Because Congress had not shown such intent, the
court held that "discrimination based on transsexualism" was beyond the
purview of Title VI.' 8 8

1n

Id.

' 566 F.2d at 661. See Dunson, supranote 30, at 469-70.
17

566 F.2d at 664.

ISOLaura Grenfell, EmbracingLaw's Categories:Anti-DiscriminationLaws and Transgenderism, 15
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 58 (2003).
.. Id. at 60.
182
1'
184

Id.
667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 748.

'

Id. at 74849.

16

Id. at 749-50.

.. Id. at 750.
1s

Id
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The Seventh Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc. 189 The plaintiff in Ulane was a pilot who had taken a leave of
absence to undergo sex reassignment surgery.190 Shortly after her return,
she was discharged; she then brought suit under Title VII. 191 The Seventh
Circuit overturned a favorable district court ruling that had reinstated her
with full seniority, back pay, and attorneys' fees. 192 Previously, the district
court had concluded that the term "sex" in Title VII did comprehend
"sexual identity." 9 3 The court had also reasoned that "'sex is not a cutand-dried matter of chromosomes,' but is in part a psychological
question-a question of self-perception; and in part a social matter-a
question of how society perceives the individual."1 94 The Seventh Circuit
rejected the district court's approach and applied a plain-meaning
construction of "sex" to deny Ulane relief. 19 5 The court held that "if
Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it was not because she is female,
but because Ulane is a transsexual-a biological male who takes female
hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to
make it appear to be female."l 96
The federal courts' narrow reading of "sex" in the Title VII context
began to change with the Supreme Court's groundbreaking 1989 decision
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 197 The plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was a
female senior manager who alleged that she had been denied partnership
and subjected to harassment by other employees because of her lack of
femininity. 198 Her coworkers continually made disparaging remarks about
her appearance, including advice to "take a course at charm school" and
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" if she wanted a chance at
a promotion. 19 9 Hopkins sued, arguing that she was a victim of
discrimination on the basis of sex. 200
' 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
90Id. at 1082-83.
192

Id. at 1082-84.
Id. at 1082.

Id. at 1084.
Id. (quoting Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (N.D. Ill. 1983)).
' 742 F.2d at 1085 ("The phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on sex, in its plain
meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they are women and against
men because they are men. The words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person who
has a sexual identity disorder, i.e., a person born with a male body who believes himself to be female,
or a person born with a female body who believes herself to be male; a prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual's sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against discrimination
based on an individual's sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which they were
born.").
i9

194

19'

Id. at 1087.

' 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
'
1
200

Id. at 235.
Id.

Id. at 232.
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In construing Title VII, the Court found that "gender must be irrelevant
to employment decisions." 20 1 Justice Brennan continued:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group, for "[i]n forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes."

202

The Court found that Hopkins had been the victim of unlawful sex
discrimination under Title VII. 2 03 Price Waterhouse marks the Court's first
acknowledgement that discriminating against employees, based on
assumptions of how they should dress and act in conjunction with their
gender, is sex discrimination. 2 04
The Supreme Court chipped further away at the rigidity of the
definition of sex discrimination in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.2 05 The plaintiff in Oncale had been subjected to repeated episodes of
sexual harassment and brutality by his male coworkers for not being a
"real" man. 206 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court,
recognizing a Title VII cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment,
despite the lack of any showing in Title VII's legislative history that would
have suggested congressional intent for same-sex harassment coverage. 20 7
The Court recognized that "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators
by which we are governed."2 0 8
Professor Grenfell argues that, based on Price Waterhouse and Oncale,
"Title VII's sex discrimination prohibitions must be construed broadly to
cover 'reasonably comparable evils' such as discrimination involving same
sex harassment and sex stereotyping." 209 Further, she argues that
"Congressional intent [in interpreting Title VII] is only relative in the face
of such 'evils."' 2 10 Under this approach, the narrow definition of "sex"
used in Title VII, predicated on a plain meaning construction of
congressional intent, is inconsistent with Title VII's goals. Rather, the
Id. at 240.
Id at 251 (quoting L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
203 490 U.S. at
258.
204 Id. at 250.
205 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
206 Id. at 77 (stating that plaintiff s coworkers "called him a name suggesting homosexuality").
207 Id. at
79.
208 Id.
209 See Grenfell, supra note 180, at 64 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S.
at 76).
210 Id
201
202
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definition of sex should be construed broadly so that Title VII can be
effective in combating the "reasonably comparable evil" of discrimination
against transsexual individuals. 2 11
In Schwenk v. Hartford,2 12 the Ninth Circuit extended the breadth of the
definition of sex, and thus offered a ray of hope for transgender plaintiffs.
In Schwenk, a pre-operative MTF inmate of a male prison brought a claim
under the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA), alleging that a prison
guard had attempted to rape her on account of her gender.2 13 The Ninth
Circuit found that the GMVA was distinguishable from Title VII because
the GMVA used the term "gender" rather than "sex." 2 14 In addressing the
defendant's argument that he had been motivated by her transsexuality,
rather than her gender, 2 15 the court considered the use of the terms "sex"
and "gender" in cases such as Holloway and Ulane.2 16 The court departed
from the traditionally narrow Title VII jurisprudence: "The initial judicial
approach taken in cases such as Holloway has been overruled by the logic
and language of Price Waterhouse."2 17 The court went on to find that the
term "sex" under Title VII encompassed both biological sex and gender. 2 18
Therefore, discrimination based on one's failure to conform to socially
prescribed gender expectations should be found in violation of Title VII.
A few state courts have also refused to follow the Holloway and Ulane
line of cases. In Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc.,2 19 the court found that
the ruling in Ulane was "unduly restrictive" and refused to follow it. 220 The
court instead stated that the plaintiff, an FTM transsexual, 22 1 was a member
of a "subgroup of men," and broadly construed the New York antidiscrimination statute to apply to him. 222
After Price Waterhouse, Oncale, and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Schwenk, it seems increasingly likely that a transsexual plaintiff may
prevail under a Title VII gender-stereotyping theory. The Third Circuit, in
Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co.,223 stated that "a plaintiff
may be able to prove ... [a sex discrimination claim] by presenting
211
212

Id.

204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).

213 Id. at 1194.

Id. at 1200-01.
Id. at 1200.
216 Id. at 1201-02.
217 Id. at 1201.
218 See 204 F.3d at 1202. See also Glenn v. Brumby, 724
F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1299 (N.D. Ga. 2010)
("This Court concurs with the majority of courts that have addressed this issue, finding that
discrimination against a transgendered individual because of their failure to conform to gender
stereotypes constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.").
219 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1995).
214
215

220 Id. at 394-95.

Id. at391.
Id. at 396 (finding that transsexuals can assert a sex discrimination claim under the New
York
anti-discrimination statute).
223 260 F.3d 257 (3rd
Cir. 2001).
221
222
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evidence that the harasser's conduct was motivated by a belief that the
victim did not conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender." 224
Similarly, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville,22 5 the Seventh Circuit
found that the sexual harassment of a male employee who wore an earring
was actionable under Title VII, since the harassment was due to behavior
that did not comply with gender norms. 226 Much of the existing negative
Title VII case law relied on Holloway as precedent, which Price
Waterhouse effectively overruled. 227 Most federal cases, however, did not
exclusively involve transsexual individuals, and the courts have not
specifically ruled on whether discrimination against transsexual individuals
constitutes sex-based discrimination. 22 8 Federal courts have yet to rule that
transsexual individuals are entitled to protection under Title VII based on
their transsexualism, and the language in Schwenk discussing sex, gender,
and Title VII remains only dicta. 229
Many other federal district court cases have not followed Price
Waterhouse, and excluded transsexuals as an unprotected class. In James v.
Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc.,230 the court held that the plaintiff, who had
been advised by an employer against dressing as a woman at work, could
not bring a claim under Title VII or the Kansas Act Against Discrimination
based on his transsexualism alone. 23 1 Additionally, in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie
Louisiana, Inc.,232 the court found that a biologically male employee, who
had occasionally presented himself as a woman outside the workplace and
had been fired for his lifestyle choices, had not stated a valid Title VII
claim. 233 The court distinguished Oiler's case from Price Waterhouse,
stating that Oiler had not been fired because he had refused "to conform to
a gender stereotype," but rather because he had "disguised himself as a
person of a different sex and presented himself as a female for stress

Id. at 262-63. See also Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding
that "sex stereotyping may constitute evidence of sex discrimination"); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel,
Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (stating that gender stereotyping
harassment is actionable under Title VII); Jones v. Pacific Rail Servs., No. 00 C 5776, 2001 WL
127645, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2001) (finding that discrimination based on a man's effeminacy is
sufficient to state a Title VII claim).
225 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
226 Id. at 580-81.
227 See Price v. Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201
(9th Cir. 2000).
228 See Grenfell, supra note 180, at
68-69.
229 See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201-02.
230 881 F. Supp. 478 (D. Kan. 1995). See also Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM,
at *6 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) ("Although discrimination because one's behavior doesn't conform to
stereotypical ideas of one's gender may amount to actionable discrimination based on sex, harassment
based on sexual preference or transgender status does not.").
231 881 F. Supp. at 481.
232 No. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16,2002).
224

233 Id. at *5-6.
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relief."234 The court found a major difference between an employee of one
sex exhibiting characteristics associated with the opposite sex, and an
employee who assumes the role of the opposite sex. 235 The former was
protected by Title VII; the latter was not. 236 The court placed
transsexualism and GID in the same category as sexual orientation and
sexual preference, the categories unprotected by Title VII. 237 The Oiler
decision has been criticized for its interpretation of Title VII. 2 38 As
Professor H6bert stated:
[T]he court may be saying. . . that while non-transgendered individuals are
entitled to wear clothing associated with the other gender, transgendered
persons are not. Alternatively, the court may be saying that while women are
allowed to dress in stereotypically male clothing, men who dress in
stereotypically female clothing are not protected from discrimination. 239

Either message could constitute discrimination on the basis of sex or

gender. 24 0
Jespersen v. Harrah'sOperating Co. 24 1 created a loophole to the Price
Waterhouse framework, where the court held that a bar's grooming and
appearance policy was not a violation of Title VII. 24 2 The policy required
women to wear makeup, their hair down and styled, stockings, nail polish,
and lip color at all times, and for men to keep their hair short and
fingernails trimmed and unpolished. 243 The court found that the policy
would have violated Title VII if it had imposed unequal burdens on men
and women, or if it had enforced an impermissible sex stereotype. 244 The
court distinguished Price Waterhouse on the basis that the policies applied
234

Id. at *5.

235 Id at *6.

Id
Id ("Title Vil's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex
include sexual identity or gender identity disorders.").
238 See, e.g., H6bert, supra note 38, at 563-64.
236
237

...

has not been interpreted to

239 Id. at 563.

240Id. at 564. See also Julie A. Seaman, The Peahen's Tale, or Dressing Our Parts at Work, 14
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 423, 462 (2007) ("[T]he notion that dress rules that facially differentiate
on the basis of sex do not give rise to a prima facie case of sex discrimination is, ironically, an
embodiment of exactly the negative sex stereotyping that the law otherwise condemns"); Chinyere Ezie,
Deconstructingthe Body: Transgenderand Intersex Identities and Sex Discrimination-TheNeed for
Strict Scrutiny, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141, 168 (2011) ("By designating which bodies and
identities are deserving of protection, law's role in the construction of sex serves to define the concept
of humanity itself.").
241 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.
2006).
242 Id. at 1106.
243 Id. at 1107.
244 Id at 1112. See Amy Lifson-Leu, Enforcing Femininity:
How Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating
Co. Leaves Women in Typically Female Jobs Vulnerable to Workplace Sex Discrimination,42 U.S.F. L.
REv. 849, 858-59 (2008).
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to all bartenders, and Jespersen had not been singled out as Ann Hopkins
had been in Price Waterhouse.245
Jespersen generated much controversy, as many critics argued that the
makeup policy did impose an unequal burden on women and, more
importantly, had been based upon sex stereotypes reinforced through dress
code. 246 While dress policies may appear "benign," they "carry hidden
dangers of unconscious discrimination and retrenchment of invidious
gender stereotypes." 247 Harrah's "Personal Best" Policy supported
stereotypes of sexual attractiveness and assumptions about gender, and
challenged the transgender notion of dress. As Professors Glazer and
Kramer noted, "Transgenderism is not a fashion choice. Even though
transgender people must make complicated decisions about how they will
present themselves to the world, their identities cannot be reduced to the
decisions they make about their wardrobe." 248 Jespersen felt "sick,
degraded, exposed, and violated" while wearing makeup at work. 249 In this
regard, Jespersen was "punished" for her lack of gender conformity. 250
Courts applying the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
provision view sex as an "immutable characteristic." 25 1 The court in
Jespersen neglected to consider that "mutable characteristics can be crucial
to one's identity," and that "policies regulating mutable characteristics can
damage one's self-esteem in profound ways." 252 Transsexuals view their
clothing as an "essential element" of their identity. 253 Critics of the
Jespersen decision contend that courts should subject employers' policies
to higher scrutiny. 2 54 McCarthy suggests a two-tier test to determine
whether such policies violate Title VII: "(1) whether the particular job
under consideration requires that the worker be of one sex only, and if so,
(2) whether that requirement is reasonably necessary to the 'essence' of the
employer's business." 255

444 F.3d at 1111.
See Seaman, supra note 240, at 439.
247 Id. at 462.
248 See Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Trans Fat 22-25, 28, Hofstra Univ.
Sch. of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-11, Penn. State Univ. Dickinson Sch. of Law Legal Studies
at
2009),
available
08-2009,
No.
Research
Paper
(reviewing ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1337129
245
246

RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD (2008)).

Jesperson v. Harrah's Operating Co. (Jespersen1l), 392 F.3d at 1076, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Lifson-Leu, supranote 244, at 857.
251 McCarthy, supranote 35, at 959.
252 Id. at 964.
249
250

253 See id.
254 See id.
255

Id. at 965 (citing Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 (N.D. Tex. 1981)).
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B. Sixth-CircuitInterpretationof Title VIIAfter Price Waterhouse
In Smith v. City of Salem, 256 the Sixth Circuit expanded on the
protections afforded by Price Waterhouse to transsexuals. In Smith, the
plaintiff had served as a lieutenant at the Salem Fire Department for seven
years without incident. 2 57 However, after he was diagnosed with GID, he
began dressing and acting more feminine. 258 The department heads planned
to force him out by requiring Smith to undergo three psychological
evaluations, which were not a normal part of lieutenant evaluation. 259 After
Smith had been informed of the plan and obtained legal representation, he
was suspended for an alleged policy infraction. 260 Smith brought suit under
Title VII, alleging that the suspension had been given in retaliation for
obtaining legal representation, and that he had been discriminated against
on the basis of sex stereotyping 2 61-just as the plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse had been.2 62 The district court found that Smith was being
discriminated against primarily due to his transsexuality, not his
employer's alleged sex stereotyping. 2 63 Since transsexuals were an
unprotected class, Smith could not be afforded Title VII protection. 2 64
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit took a different view and reversed the prior
decision. 265 The court emphasized that "sex stereotyping" was not merely a
"term of art" used in Price Waterhouse to describe a certain type of sex
discrimination, but rather a new category of Title VII protections. 266 The
court also found that, though transsexuality itself was not a protected
category under Title VII, "[s]ex stereotyping based on a person's gender
non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of
the cause of that behavior." 267 Title VII prohibited discrimination based on
gender performance, regardless of whether an individual was
transsexual.2 68 Citing more recent precedent, the court accepted the
expansion of Title VII protections set forth in Price Waterhouse.2 69 Most
importantly, the court blatantly rejected the logic of cases such as Oiler,
which had placed transsexual individuals into an unprotected "transsexual"
category and then used the categorization to legitimize discrimination
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 568.
258 id
259 Id at 568-69 (stating that the defendant employer did not follow state
procedures for disciplinary
action).
260 Id. at 569.
261 id.
262 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
250-51 (1989).
263 Smith v. City of Salem, No. 4:02CV1405, 2003 WL 25720984,
at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2003).
264 id
265 378 F.3d at
578.
266 Id. at 575.
267 id.
268 See
id.
269 Id. at 574.
256

257
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based on gender non-conformity.2 7 0 Instead, the court pointed out that "a
label, such as 'transsexual,' is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where
the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender nonconformity." 271
Following the Smith analysis, another transsexual litigant was
successful under the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping approach in Barnes
v. City of Cincinnati.2 72 In Barnes, Philecia (then Phillip) Barnes sued the
City of Cincinnati under Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination
after the Cincinnati Police Department ("CPD") had demoted him from
sergeant to police officer. 273 Barnes, an MTF transsexual, had served as a
police officer for eighteen years. 274 She then sat for a promotional test,
placed eighteenth out of 105 officers, and was promoted to the rank of
sergeant. 275 Following her promotion, Sergeant Barnes began a standard
probationary period. 27 6 Despite her high score on the exam and long record
on the force, Barnes was intensely scrutinized, much more so than other
probationary sergeants, and was given harsh evaluations and unfavorable
assignments. 277 Eventually, Sergeant Barnes failed probation and was
demoted to the rank of officer. 278
Throughout this period, Barnes had been subjected to repeated
comments about her sexuality and feminine appearance. 279 A lieutenant
colonel had raised the issue of Barnes' appearance and lack of masculinity
when he demoted Barnes. 280 Barnes' evaluations reported that she "lacked
command presence" and had "failed to comply with grooming and uniform
standards." 28 1 In addition, the sergeant assigned to supervise Barnes during
her probation "repeatedly discussed sexual topics with [Barnes] . . . asking
about oral and anal sex and whether [he] himself was a 'pretty
motherfucker."' 282 Barnes alleged in her complaint that she had been
"treated differently by [the CPD] because it viewed him to be insufficiently
masculine to be a sergeant in the CPD."2 83 In her own words, Barnes

270

id.
378 F.3d at 574.
272 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir.
2005).
273 Id. at 733-35.
274 Id. at 733.
275 id
276 id
277 See id. at 734-35.
278 401 F.3d at
735.
279 Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-00-780, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26207, at *8 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 8, 2002) (stating that a lieutenant colonel, who had seen Barnes "wearing pink lipstick, opaque
pink nail polish, and ... eyebrow pencil" at work, had "ordered [Barnes] to stop wearing makeup, cut
his nails, and cut his hair and told him that he needed to maintain a more masculine image.").
280 Id. at
*9.
281 Id. at *7.
282 Id. at *9.
283 Id. at *14.
271
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stated, "I was discriminated against because I was a transsexual who did
not fit the masculine type of average male supervisor." 284
The district court in Barnes relied on Ulane and Sommers in concluding
that Title VII did not protect against discrimination on the basis of
transsexuality. 285 However, the court did apply the Price Waterhouse
rationale in recognizing that "Title VII prohibits discrimination against a
man because he fails to conform to the stereotypes associated with being
male."2 86 Therefore, the court denied summary judgment to the City,
finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Barnes'
failure to conform to sexual stereotypes had been a motivating factor in her
demotion. 287 At trial, the jury awarded Barnes $150,000 in compensatory
damages. 288
The case was then appealed to the Sixth Circuit.289 The City.claimed
that Barnes had not established a claim of sex discrimination because she
was not a member of a protected class, and had "failed to identify a
similarly situated employee" who had not been demoted after probation. 290
However, the court found that Barnes was a member of a protected class
under Smith-a class for those who were discriminated against for failure
to conform to sex stereotypes, "whether as a man or a woman. 29 1 The court
directly followed its previous holding in Smith, stating that being
transsexual was not fatal to a Title VII claim. 292 In regards to the City's
claim that Barnes had not found someone similarly situated with whom she
could compare her situation, the court found that since Barnes was the only
sergeant to fail probation from 1993 through 2000, she did not need to find
someone who had been in her exact position. 293 The court ultimately
denied each of the City's claims of error, and affirmed the decision of the
lower court. 294
Though several circuits have followed the lead of Price Waterhouse,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently narrowed that decision in
regards to transgender discrimination. In Vickers v. Fairfield Medical
Center,2 95 the court found that "a gender stereotyping claim should not be

284
285

Id. at *14-15.
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26207 at *13-14.

286 Id. at *14.
287 Id. at *17-18. Having defeated the City of Cincinnati's summary judgment motion, Barnes
proceeded to trial, where she prevailed. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2005).
288
289

401 F.3d at 735.

Id
Id. at 737.
291 Id. at 739.
292 id
293 Id. at 737.
2
401 F.3d at 747. See also Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d
653, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (finding that plaintiffs transsexuality did not bar her sex stereotyping claim).
295 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir.
2006).
290
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used to bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII."2 96 In
Vickers, a private police officer brought suit against his employer, alleging
repeated episodes in which coworkers had called him a "fag," made lewd
remarks, "shove[d] a sanitary napkin in [his] face," and implied that he
experienced menstruation cycles. 29 7 The court affirmed the prior dismissal
of the plaintiffs claims because he had "failed to allege that he did not
conform to traditional gender stereotypes in any observable way at work,"
and instead had alleged discrimination based on sexual orientation, which
was not protected by Title VII. 298 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Lawson
noted that he had "no quarrel with the proposition that a careful distinction
must be drawn between cases of gender stereotyping, which are actionable,
and cases denominated as such that in reality seek protection for sexualorientation discrimination, which are not." 299
The difficulty in discerning whether a discriminatory comment is based
on sex stereotyping or sexual orientation should not be a hurdle that
prohibits a plaintiff from defeating a motion to dismiss. Acts of
discrimination based on sex stereotyping and sexual orientation intertwine
often, and the courts must find a way to address both issues. Perhaps the
court should not have to draw a line between the two categories, and
Congress instead should define discrimination to include both sex
stereotyping and sexual orientation. Until then, the courts should continue
to read precedent more expansively, instead of narrowing sex-stereotyping
claims to those that involve discrimination based solely on one's
mannerisms and outward characteristics.
C. Is Title VII the Way to Approach TranssexualDiscriminationClaims?
Based on these recent cases, the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping
approach appears well tailored for transsexual claims against
discrimination. 300 It is a method by which transsexuals may be protected
under existing anti-discrimination law. However, although the broad
Id. at 764 (quoting Dawson v. Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 768-69.
298 Id. at 764.
299 Id at 767 (Lawson, J., dissenting).
3
See Grenfell, supra note 180, at 67-69. See also Angela Clements, Sexual Orientation, Gender
Nonconformity, and Trait-Based Discrimination:Cautionary Talesfrom Title VII and an Argumentfor
Inclusion, 24 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 166, 195, 206 (2009) ("There are three primary
concerns, each of which reflects growth and change either within the LGBT movement or societal
change that the movement itself set in motion: 1) intuitively and pragmatically, gender nonconformity
does not belong under a sexual orientation-only framework; 2) a broader antidiscrimination framework
is needed in light of generational shifts because LGBT youth increasingly hold gender identity and
sexual orientation as equally important identities; 3) settling on a sexual-orientation only framework
undermines the stated goals of the LGBT movement.... A gender identity-inclusive [Employment
Non-Discrimination Act] may hold hope for a new vision of LGBT antidiscrimination law by
definitively connecting gender identity with sexual orientation, so that gender identity protections are
understood as protecting all workers, not just transgender individuals.").
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definitions of sex and gender stereotyping have proven successful for some,
drawbacks also remain.
By forcing transsexual litigants into the anti-male/-female Title VII
framework, society reinforces the binary sex/gender system that the transmovement struggles to deconstruct. By adopting the gender stereotyping
approach, society gives credence to and reinforces the dual nature of
societal gender norms. While such use of Title VII provides much-needed
protection to females who exhibit masculine traits and males who exhibit
feminine traits, it also may work to undermine the recognition of
transsexual individuals outside the current construction of sex and gender.
By using a binary anti-discrimination framework, a framework based on
the notion of opposites, society fails to explain and explore, let alone
remedy, the discrimination that transsexual individuals truly suffer. Even
though this framework may protect an individual transsexual claimant, it
ignores the complexity and multiplicity of transgender identity as a
whole. 30 1
Indeed, Price Waterhouse itself may be interpreted to reemphasize the
binary sex/gender system in noting that Title VII was intended to prohibit
discrimination against "men and women." 302 On the other hand, Price
Waterhouse may also be interpreted as a significant step towards
dismantling the binary way in which most people think about sex and
gender. 303 Price Waterhouse, Smith, and Barnes all implied that when
employers discriminate on the basis of gender, they are subject to claims
under Title VII. 304 As these cases showed, gender is not narrowly defined
as only "male" or "female," but may be displayed by some in ways that are
not strictly male or female, somewhere on the spectrum of human
gender. 30 5 Though framed in the narrow terms of "gender stereotyping,"
implying only "male" and "female" stereotypes and nothing broader, this is
ultimately a forward step in deconstructing binary ideas of sex and, thus,
dismantling the binary system. By first deconstructing the stereotypes that
created this binary system of thought, society can then begin to dismantle
the binary system as a whole.
Professor H6bert argues that discrimination against transgender
employees is "classic sex discrimination." 30 6 She argues that transsexuals,
"as men and women," 30 7 are presumably entitled to protection from sexbased discrimination. 3 08 However, transsexual people may not describe
30' See, e.g., deManda, supranote 5, at 508.

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
See deManda, supra note 5, at 508.
3
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250-51; Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (2004);
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005).
301 See deManda, supra note 5, at 517.
3
See Hdbert, supranote 38, at 537.
307 Id. at 548.
301 Id. at 548-49.
302
303
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themselves as "men" or as "women." 309 They also may not describe
themselves as "men who act like women," or "women who want to be
men." Not everyone can be reduced to such simple labels. As long as we
use the binary labels woman/man, female/male, or feminine/masculine to
describe the experiences and discrimination against transsexual individuals,
we confuse and erase their true identities and reinforce a system in which
they have no space to exist, legally or socially. When society can
understand who transsexual individuals are, as well as the definitions and
terms that they use, it will have constructed a new labeling system for
something that it struggles to understand. The issue is not reducing
individuals to simple labels; it is that new labels are needed to fit new
situations.
D. Tension Between Disability Law andDiscriminationLaw
The struggles that transsexual plaintiffs encounter also demonstrate the
tension between disability law and discrimination law. At first glance, these
two fields appear to be complementary, as many state anti-discrimination
statutes cover disability. However, transsexual advocates increasingly
argue that relying on their disabled status to litigate claims actually comes
at the expense of their rights under discrimination laws. 3 10
Specifically, some advocates worry that relying on the DSM-IV
diagnosis of GID, although helpful for many transsexuals, serves to overmedicalize their condition, so that transgender individuals who do not have
access to medical care, particularly the low-income and the young, are left
without any legal protection. 3 11 Thus, because relying on disability
discrimination is under-inclusive, one critic calls this strategy "an injurious
Band-Aid." 3 12 For example, in Enriquez, a significant part of the court's
ruling concerned the plaintiffs gender dysphoria diagnosis. 3 13 The
language in the opinion limited protection to transsexuals seeking medical
treatment for their condition, and did not cover transsexual individuals who
do not pursue medical treatment and face discrimination simply because
they do not conform to stereotyped gender roles. 3 14 This "injurious BandAid," of course, is not limited to the employment context. 315

See TRANS LIBERATION, supra note 33, at 5.
310 See Spade, supranote 156, at 34.
" See id at 33.
3

Levy, supra note 64, at 165-67.
Id. at 165; Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., Inc., 777 A.2d 365, 370-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001).
314 Levy, supra note 64,
at 165.
315 See Minter & Frye, supranote 155 ("Accepting the notion that we are mentally ill in order to gain
some limited protections on the basis of disability will not protect transgendered parents who are denied
custody or the right to adopt on the basis that they have a mental impairment which renders them
unsuitable parents.").
31"
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Thus, relying on disability claims, although helpful to GID-diagnosed
transsexuals, may actually harm the legal rights of non-diagnosed
transsexuals who would be denied protection under disability and
discrimination law. By relying on a "medicalized and pathologizing
approach to gender difference," courts may be tempted to continue favoring
disability claims while ignoring broader and more appropriate claims of
gender discrimination. 3 16 As a result, the disability rights model should be
abandoned in favor of a more comprehensive civil rights agenda that
protects all transsexual individuals from discrimination, regardless of
whether they are diagnosed with GID. 317
IV. A

BETTER APPROACH

A. Changes at the State Level
To date, transsexual individuals have struggled to protect themselves
from discrimination by "fitting" themselves into existing antidiscrimination frameworks, such as disability and sex discrimination law.
This has been necessary because there is no comprehensive legal protection
for them. One reason for this problem is that we, as a society, lack
sufficient language to describe transsexual experience. Without describing
it, we cannot understand it, and we cannot recognize it. Leslie Feinberg
urges us to expand our "concepts and language of gender possibilities." 3 18
For her, this includes the use of gender-neutral pronouns such as s/he,
pronounced "sea." 3 19 Until the law recognizes that there are many shades
of gender, it will continue to use existing gender labels to describe
transsexual individuals. By doing so, it perpetuates a narrow concept of
gender possibility that is unable to accurately describe trans-people, which
consequently reinforces the binary sex/gender system. Because the law
cannot describe, understand, or recognize trans-people, it will remain a
largely ineffective tool in supporting their individual rights.
Two basic theories have emerged on how to solve the complex issue of
redefining gender to include those who fall outside of the current system.
Professor Kogan quotes Martine Rothblatt, who argues that gender should
be seen on a "sexual continuism," without exclusive male and female
characteristics. 32 0 Rothblatt posits that society should discontinue labeling
children as male or female the instant they leave the womb, and embrace a
more sociological construction of sex and gender rather than a biological
one, allowing individuals to change their gender identities as they become
316
317
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See Spade, supra note 156, at 35-36.
See Minter & Frye, supra note 155.
TRANs LIBERATION, supra note 33, at 29.

Id. at71.
Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a Restroom
Labeled "Other",48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1238 (1997).
320

No. 4]

What Best to ProtectTranssexualsfrom Discrimination

317

influenced by society. 321 Kogan, however, disagrees and suggests instead
that we place members of sex/gender minorities into a distinct third
category of sex/gender. 322 This "other" category would encourage society
to deny traditional notions of binary sex and gender, and embrace the
differences of individuals who are not "male" or "female." 3 23 He believes
that a theory of gender as a "continuism," as Rothblatt suggests, would
require a complete deconstruction of "male" and "female" altogether. 324
Since the vast majority of society identifies comfortably with either male or
female, it is essential, Kogan believes, that we keep these ideas intact while
still accommodating those who do not fit into either category. 32 5 Gender
should be conceptualized like a color spectrum-for example, there is solid
definition as to what "blue" is, but a range of colors that can be considered
blue. Similarly, there should be fluidity in the expression of gender. 326 This
strategy serves to stretch Western society's current system of binary
thopght rather than completely overhauling that system. The real solution is
to find a way to fit transgender individuals into our binary system by
thinking of gender as a spectrum, with masculine males at one end and
feminine females at the other. 32 7 All individuals could benefit from a
change in the binary conception of sex and gender, by which all individuals
would be free to express themselves fully, without fear of harassment or
discrimination. 32 8
The bottom line remains that once we are able to describe and to
understand transgender individuals, we can begin to recognize the space
they occupy in our society. To reach this conceptualization from a legal
standpoint, it is necessary to create a new trans-jurisprudence-a
comprehensive set of anti-discrimination laws that explicitly protect
transgender individuals in all aspects of their lives. Once transgenderism
becomes a distinct category recognized by law, transgender individuals will
have an avenue to express their collective and individual struggles, and to
32

Id. at 1240.

322 Id. at 1245-47.
323 Id. at 1245.

324 Id. at 1250.

Id. at 1251-52.
See Ellis & Eriksen, supra note 23, at 289-90.
327 See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the
Collision Between
Law andBiology,41 ARIZ. L. REv. 265, 327 (1999) (arguing that sex and gender should "range across a
spectrum," with "male" and "female" at each end). See also Schilt & Connell, supra note 34, at 601
(quoting Silvia Gherardi, GENDER, SYMBOLISM AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES 4 (1995)) ("If we
are to escape the gender trap, if we are to free ourselves of the idea that there exist two and only two
types of individuals, if we are to ensure that social differentiation is no longer based on sexual
differentiation, we must destabilize all thought which dichotomizes.").
328 See Gilden, supra note 36, at 85 ("Gender fluidity does not entail a wholesale erasure of gender
differentiation, but it does require the elimination of a conceptual hierarchy between the gender roles
we do acknowledge. It does not look to biology or anatomy as necessary determinants of gender roles,
but it does acknowledge bodily difference as a potentially material component of gender
construction.").
325
326

WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER

318

[Vol. 32

be accepted and treated equally in society. Kogan's theory of placing
individuals who fall outside of the norm in a category labeled "other" may
be the best way to encourage the law to create transgender-protective
legislation. 329 Since the law is seemingly based on definitions and attempts
to categorize various terms and groups of people, 330 Kogan's theory may
allow legislators, judges, and politicians to better understand why
transgender individuals need the law's protection. Many times, when the
law cannot define a category, it is excluded from legal protection. 33 1 If the
law could change to understand that there are not merely two gender
choices, male and female, but a third option outside of the two, then it may
begin to accommodate that third choice. Additionally, the judicial system
and state and federal legislatures must fundamentally alter their attitudes
towards sex, gender, and identity. This will be a lengthy and demanding
task, but without this opportunity, transsexual individuals will never be
perceived as truly equal before the law.
Some evidence does exist that we may be well on our way to
accomplishing the task of protecting transgender employees. Many major
private companies are beginning to protect transgender individuals in the
workplace. 332 In 2005 alone, BP, Ernst & Young, Microsoft, Viacom,
Toys"R"Us, Chevron, and Merrill Lynch instituted anti-discrimination
policies for transgender employees. 33 3 Today, over 200 companies have
transgender human resources policies. 3 34 "[A]nalysis of U.S. employers
with transgender policies shows that their policies were usually adopted
335
prior to any transgender anti-discrimination laws in their home state."
This implies a developing trend in transgender legislation. Since the law
will likely follow the private sector's efforts at transgender protection, as
transgender policies in private companies increase, state legislation may
change as well.
B. Changes on a FederalStatutory Level
Throughout the past forty years, federal laws such as the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,336 the Fair Housing Act, 337 and the Gender Motivated
Violence Act 3 38 have sought to protect the constitutional rights of minority
329
330
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groups, and to a great extent, have succeeded. A decade and a half after its
passage, the ADA has also proven to be an effective tool for a broad range
of disabled groups to gain redress for discrimination. For transsexual
litigants, however, the struggle to gain equal rights in the post-ADA era has
not only remained daunting, but has largely become even more difficult,
since their exclusion from the ADA was effectively a codification of the
legal system's hostility towards them. 339 Removing the onerous provision
from the ADA, while a necessary first step, is not sufficient. Although state
and local governments have successfully passed legislation specifically
banning discrimination against transsexuals, it appears unlikely that
Congress will be able to enact such an anti-discrimination statute. Congress
withdrew support for the inclusion of transsexuals in the Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA) of 2007.340
In her article, "Twenty-First Century Equal Protection: Making Law in
an Interregnum," 3 41 Professor Hunter examines Justice O'Connor's Equal
Protection Clause argument in her concurring opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas 34 2 and proposes a means of utilizing that opinion to change social
norms in the future. 34 3 Justice O'Connor notes an "institutional dilemma"
in the court system, a "tension between its extraordinary power to
See supratext accompanying notes 85-102; 42 U.S.C. § 1221 1(b)(1) (2010).
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2007 was an effort to include transgender
individuals as members of a protected class within the framework of current anti-discrimination laws.
H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007). Though ENDA passed in a 235-184 vote at the House of
Representatives, dissenters criticized the bill for removing gender identity, thus leaving the bill
"woefully incomplete." See Hebert, supra note 38, at 544 (citation omitted). They argued that such
exclusion was done for fear that protecting transgendered individuals would "jeopardize the bill's
chances for clean passage on the House floor." Id. Thus, an amendment to protect individuals against
discrimination based on gender identity was withdrawn. Id. at 553; Bill Summary & Status: 110th
Congress (2007-2008),
HAMDT.884,
L1IRARY
OF
CONGRESS
THOMAS
(2007),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl l0:HZ884:. Many of the sentiments expressed by Senator
Jesse Helms were reinvigorated by those opposed to an amendment to include gender identity. Hdbert,
supra note 38, at 546 n.66, 547 n.68. Representative Souder stated:
3

340

This is the start of a move that many of us who just simply don't approve of the lifestyle,
there are many different things we don't approve of, but this is a deeply held position of
faith by millions of Americans. And this is an attempt, a start, of what's likely to be an
increasing effort to have sexual liberties trump religious liberties.
Id. at 547 n.68.
Still, hope lies beneath the surface of the failed vote. Representative Baldwin, the sponsor of the
amendment to include gender identity, stated that transgendered individuals "have not been forgotten
and Congress's job will not be finished until they too share fully in the American Dream." Id at 546.
Many supporters expressed their frustration that the bill did not include gender identity, and that they
would have supported the amendment. Id. In fact, the debate over the inclusion of transgendered
individuals in ENDA demonstrates an "increasing awareness of the widespread injustices wrought by
mainstream understandings of sex and gender." See Gilden, supra note 36, at 84.
34' Nan D. Hunter, Twenty-First Century Equal Protection:Making Law in an Interregnum, 7 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 141 (2006).
342 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
343 See Hunter, supranote 342, at 141-44.
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invalidate laws adopted by democratic processes and its duty to protect
minorities from abusive policies." 344
In order to affect change, "social minorities use the litigation of
constitutional claims as one of the early strategies for legal reform." 345
Judicial action can often lead to the passage of legislation protecting such
minorities, but the point in between such action has been termed by Hunter
as "a kind of legal-political interregnum." 346 Additionally, Hunter argues
that "constitutional equal protection arguments succeed or fail based in part
on an assessment of whether they are likely to succeed politically." 347 A
minority group tends to gain momentum and legitimacy when the Supreme
Court uses a standard of heightened review in an equal protection claim. 34 8
Justice O'Connor made favorable headway for future equal protection
claims by homosexuals in her concurring opinion, since she regarded
"objectives, such as 'a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,' are not legitimate state interests." 349 Hunter argues that to
determine whether a heightened rational basis test should be applied, the
court should look at three questions:
Is the disadvantaged group politically unpopular?
Can the court reasonably infer that animus (either a desire to harm or moral
disapproval) toward this group infected the adoption or application of the law?
Can the defending state actor demonstrate that a rational reason or
legitimate policy objective, other than animus, actually motivated the
challenged classification? 350

Hunter's analysis advocates for homosexuals gaining greater legal and
political rights, but her objectives apply as well to transgender individuals.
In order to affect change, the social minority of transgender individuals
must bring constitutional claims and attempt to shift the interregnum
towards a heightened rational basis review. Like homosexuals, transgender
individuals would greatly benefit from a test of increased scrutiny. Just as
many laws morally disapprove of homosexuals, the same is true for the
transgender population. By bringing such claims to the judiciary's
attention, this social minority may be able to affect social, political, and
judicial change. Instead of being labeled as disabled, transgender

344
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345Id at 145.
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348Id. at 147.
349 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
3so Hunter, supranote 342, at 150.
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individuals could attempt to change the way the courts and society view
their claims of discrimination.
Professor Feldblum looks specifically at what the Supreme Court
opinion in Lawrence could mean for the future of the transgender
population. 3 51 She examines the role that government should play in
securing the rights and "liberty interest[s]" of the transgender
population. 352 Lawrence indicated that a right to sexual privacy existed, but
did not label that right as fundamental. 35 3 By protecting sexual privacy, the
Court allowed those individuals to engage in a "protected liberty
activity." 354 However, Feldblum argues that sexual privacy should be a
fundamental right: "A person's sexual anatomy, and hence that person's
sense of sexual self, is core to an individual's self-definition. Similarly,
one's sense of gender is core to one's sense of self."355
Feldblum asserts that "we have collectively decided as a society to
adopt certain norms that make certain members of our society live 'on a
tilt."' 356 For example, buildings are built without access for the
handicapped, bathrooms are segregated by gender, and marriage is denied
to homosexuals. 357 In order to correct this "tilt," the government must be
actively engaged. 358 Feldblum argues that "if the particular tilt at issue is
related to a person's core, essential self-definition, then the government has
a constitutional obligation to rectify any tilt created by background social
norms." 35 9 Instead of focusing on the negative rights imposed by the
Constitution, there exists "a positive obligation to rectify tilts created by
society."3 60 For example, the government should ensure that individuals
who have chosen to change their genders "are not punished for that
decision through the loss of a job, the denial of housing, or the denial of
goods and services." 36 1 In addition, the government should facilitate the
ability for transgender individuals to obtain personal documentation and
identification that reflect their presenting gender, as well as the ability to
choose whichever restroom they associate with their gender identity. 362 In
doing so, the government can attempt to rectify social attitudes. 363
351 See Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One's Own Concept of Existence: What Lawrence
Can Meanfor Intersex and TransgenderPeople, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 115, 116-17 (2006).
352 Id.
353

Id. at 119.

.. Id. at 124.
35

id.

Id. at 129 (quoting Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons from Religion,
Disability, Sexual Orientationand Transgender,54 ME. L. REv. 159, 181 (2002)).
357 Feldblum, supra note 352, at 129.
. See id. at 129-30.
3 Id. at 130.
360 id.
361 Id. at 137.
362 Id. at 137-38.
363 Feldblum, supra note 352,
at 137-38.
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Thus, taken together, Hunter and Feldblum's theories may prove
effective for the transgender population. As Hunter articulates, the Equal
Protection Clause may be a powerful tool for social minorities that could
lead to political change. 364 The transgender population may now bring suit
based on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence, and lobby
for a heightened rational basis application in Equal Protection Clause cases.
Feldblum's theory of governmental involvement in rectifying the "tilt"
further helps social minorities, like the transgender population, in gaining
access to their personal liberty interests, autonomy, and self-definition. 365
Instead of being labeled as "disabled" or "different," transgender
individuals may be able to affect change that allows them to have the same
liberty and social interests as those who do not share their lifestyle or
identity.
V. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article is to recognize the hardships faced by
transsexual individuals as a result of our society's binary sex/gender
system, and to identify potential ways in which we can work towards
ending this marginalization. Our society's binary sex/gender system serves
to exclude transsexual individuals in many ways, including employment
discrimination, police harassment, sexism, low wages, job insecurity, fewer
adoption opportunities, and less accessible medical care. Transsexual
individuals remain excluded from the ADA, and while some state disability
laws have provided more protection, we are still far away from anything
resembling comprehensive disability protection for transsexual individuals.
Furthermore, attempting to end transsexual discrimination through the basis
of disability laws is an implicit admission that transsexual individuals are
somehow flawed, which many would not concede even in the face of
obvious pragmatic advantages.
The Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and
subsequent Sixth Circuit decisions give transsexuals hope that Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act may be an avenue for discrimination relief in
individual circumstances. However, while this framework might protect an
individual transsexual claimant, it ignores the complexity and multiplicity
of transgender identity as a whole. Title VII relief also reinforces the same
binary sex/gender system that transgender individuals wish to reconstruct,
since Title VII was intended to prohibit discrimination against "men and
women." Thus, neither disability law nor Title VII is the most appropriate
remedy for transgender discrimination.
It would be ideal to create a new trans-jurisprudence that reconstructs
our beliefs and norms related to the binary sex/gender system, and protects
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transgender individuals in all aspects of life by helping the law to
understand that there are not only two gender choices, but a third category
of "others." This approach, however, may not be immediately feasible, and
is at least temporarily unrealistic. Ending transgender discrimination by
altering the binary sex/gender system is unlikely because society has long
followed this system, and the majority sees no problem with it.
Thus, the method of change that is most appropriate and practical for
ending transgender discrimination is through challenges using the Equal
Protection Clause, as homosexuals did in Lawrence v. Texas. A minority
group can gain momentum and legitimacy when heightened review is given
in regards to equal protection claims. Heightened review should be applied
to equal protection claims when the disadvantaged group is politically
unpopular, and the law was possibly applied or enacted due to animus
against the group. Many laws that discriminate against transsexual
individuals are of a moral nature. By bringing these claims, transgender
equality could be triggered by the judiciary rather than through legislation,
and as a result, society could begin to treat transsexuals equally, without
identifying them as disabled or flawed individuals. Once the judiciary and
society become aware of and receptive to the need to end discrimination
against transgender individuals, the government could then rectify the law
to coincide with these new social norms.
Currently, sixteen states and one hundred forty-three cities and
counties 3 66 have enacted laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
gender identity or expression, covering over 25% of the U.S. population. 367
As more states adopt transgender legislation, the federal government may
very well follow. Equal Protection Clause challenges can notify the
judiciary of existing inequality, and may inspire even more change. Let us
hope that it is only a matter of time before the transgender minority can
share the same rights and opportunities as the majority. Though there is a
long road to travel, it seems possible that transgender individuals could be a
part of the majority before too long.
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